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Abstract
Sandbox applications can be used as anti-forensics techniques to hide important evidence in the digital
forensics investigation. There is limited research on sandboxing technologies, and the existing researches on
sandboxing are focusing on the technology itself. The impact of sandbox applications on live digital forensics
investigation has not been systematically analysed and documented. In this study, we proposed a methodology
to analyse sandbox applications on Windows systems. The impact of having standalone sandbox applications
on Windows operating systems image was evaluated. Experiments were conducted to examine the artefacts of
three sandbox applications: Sandboxie, BufferZone and ToolWiz Time Freeze on Windows 7, Windows Server
12 R2 and Windows XP operating systems in 2018. We found that (1) only the installed applications can
be found after deleting the ToolWiz Time Freeze content. Unlike Sandboxie, the data can be retrieved from
the memory images even after deleting the application’s content if the system was not restated; (2) not all
the sandbox applications data will be deleted after restarting the systems, e.g., BufferZone’s content can be
retrieved even after restarting the system.
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1. Introduction
Digital forensic investigation are used to analyse digital
evidence from different kind of digital devices. There
are two types of digital forensic categories: The first
category is offline digital forensics, the acquisition
of the suspect devices images conducted while the
device is shut down [1]. Offline digital forensics
acquires the suspect device’s hard disks bit by bit. In
contrast, in the second category, the suspect device’s
images are acquired while the device is running to
acquire the volatile data. This type is known as live
digital forensics. The volatile data is collected by
acquiring the system memory images [2]. According

∗ Corresponding author. Email: wen.zeng.wz@gmail.com

to [3], analysing memory forensics images can reveal
different kinds of system information, such as running
processes, installed malware, cryptographic keys, the
system registry, established network information, open
files, system state and application-related data. The
memory forensics images can reveal evidence that a
malicious user might be trying to hide by using antiforensics tools. Anti-forensics is a technique used by
cybercriminals to challenge evidence acquisitions and
analysis processes, e.g., sandboxing.
Sandbox applications can be used as anti-forensics
techniques to hide critical evidence in the forensic
investigation, e.g., web browsing history. Sandboxing
technology restricts the application and user setting
by using various tools, such as virtual machine and
standalone applications. In [4], the authors defined
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sandboxing as "an isolated environment initially used
to test new programming code, to perform malware
analysis and automate the process of studying and
for anti-forensics". Windows operating system sandbox
applications hook the system calls to ensure the change
does not affect the system. Several sandbox applications
run on Windows systems, several of them sign specific
clusters on the hard disk to write the data, e.g.,
Sandboxie and BufferZone. Other sandbox applications
create and save a virtual copy of the whole system,
which restore the saved state after restarting the system,
e.g., ToolWiz Time Freeze. Some sandbox applications
will lose their content after restarting the system,
indicating the importance of a live digital forensics
investigation.
This study will propose a methodology to analyse the
impact of standalone sandbox applications on Windows
live images. Using live digital forensics tools to acquire
and analyse system memory images containing sandbox
applications will help identify the hidden evidence.
We will examine the effect of sandbox applications on
memory’s images of Windows 7, Windows Server 2012
and Windows XP.
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2
is the preliminary material. Section 3 will discuss
the methodology to analyse the impact of sandbox
applications on Windows live digital forensics images.
In Section 4, we will conduct the experiments. Section 5
will discuss the experiments results and the limitations
of this study. Section 6 concludes the study.

2. Preliminary Material
In this section, we will discuss the background and
related work.

2.1. Sandbox Applications
“Sandboxing is a technique for creating confined execution
environments to protect sensitive resources from illegal
access” and “a container, limits or reduces the level of access
its applications have” [5] – which indicates that sandbox
applications hook the system calls to prevent a specific
process from interacting with the rest of the system.
There are six types of sandboxing techniques. The
first type is Applets, which are used by the web browser
to run website programs inside the sandbox using a
virtual machine or an interpreter, e.g., Java Applets
and adobe flash [6]. The second type of sandboxing
technique is Jails, where the operating system bound
the program resources. An example of a Jail is virtual
hosting [6]. Virtual machine is the third type of
sandboxing technique, where another operating system
will be running an isolated from the host operating
system by using tools to run virtual machines, such
as Oracle virtual box and VMware. The fourth type
of sandboxing technology is rule-based execution, where

the user can control the programs registry access and
the interaction between programs, e.g., SELinux [6].
The fifth sandboxing technique is a built-in operating
system feature known as Seccomp, which was built in
Linux 2.6.23. The feature limits a program’s calls to
four system calls and terminates any attempting to
create another call [6]. The last type of sandboxing
technique is standalone applications, e.g., Sandboxie
and BufferZone. Our study focuses on the standalone
applications.
Standalone applications isolate the programs using
different methods depending on the program. One of
the methods is creating virtual space on the disk to
run the programs on, save the created registry keys
and the file. This virtual space will be cleared after
closing the sandbox application, such as Sandboxie and
Avast [7]. Another method is creating virtual zones
inside the system where all files that the programs
will create will be isolated from the rest of the
system, e.g., BufferZone application [7]. An alternative
method is creating multiple virtual machines inside
the system where changes will only affect the specific
virtual machine, an example is an iCore application,
which only runs on Windows XP operating system
[6]. Another sandbox application method is creating
a virtual copy of the whole operating system and
restoring the operating system backup after finishing,
e.g., ToolWiz Time Freeze and Shadow Defender. Some
of the standalone sandbox applications only isolate web
browsing, such as BitBox [8].
In [6], the authors evaluated Windows standalone
sandbox applications by conducting a series of network
test, memory test, CPU bond test and disk test without
discussing the applications artefacts on the system.
The results find that there are no difference in the
memory or the network when using the standalone
sandbox applications. Therefore, the reading from the
disk will be delayed because the sandbox applications
will hook the calls. [9] is a survey on the sandbox
applications techniques, but the authors only focused
on the Unix operating system sandbox applications.
In [7], the authors discussed Windows and Unix
sandbox implementations, three of the Windows
sandbox applications methodology is discussed. In
[4], the authors stated that sandbox applications
could be used as anti-forensics applications to cover
forensic evidence. Using the sandbox applications as
anti-forensics indicate the importance of having a
methodology to investigate the sandbox applications
data. In our study, we will focus on the standalone
sandbox applications indicators of compromise on
Windows systems.
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2.2. Windows Live Digital Forensics
The acquisition of the suspect devices images conducted while the devices are shut down, which known
as offline digital forensics [1]. The live digital forensics
acquire volatile data that cannot be acquired using
offline digital forensics, the suspect devices are running
during the acquisition process [1]. Volatile data are
constantly changing and not structured in predefined
ways as hard disks [10]. In [10], the authors pointed out
that RAM data will change in time while the computer
is in sleep mode.
According to [3], analysing memory forensics images
can reveal system information, such as running
processes, installed malware, cryptography keys, the
system registry, established network information, open
files, system state and application-related data. The
analysis of live data includes saving and analysing
volatile data such as Pagefile, Hibernation file, Crash
Dump files and most importantly RAM - Random
Access Memory [10].
The physical memory acquisition conducted by two
approaches, the first approach is hardware-based tools
and the second approach is software-based tools [2].
The hardware-based tools bypass the operating system
using physical devices, which open a communication
port to copy the content of the physical memory [2].
The software-based tools work at the user level and the
kernel level. The user level tools create a full memory
dump of the target machine, which was restricted from
Windows 2003 due to security reasons [3]. The kernel
level acquisition tools use kernel drivers to overcome
user-level tools limitations. However, the kernel level
tools might break system security and cause system
instability [3].

2.3. Windows Sandbox Applications Forensics
Sandbox applications and virtualisation techniques can
cover evidence from the suspect’s devices, which is
known as anti-forensics. The users can use sandbox
applications, and then delete the application’s content
to hide the evidence, some of these applications data
will be erased after restarting the machine. However, in
[4], the authors suggest using sandbox applications and
virtualisation techniques as an aid in digital forensics
by using the tools to examine the artefacts of any
applications that run within the sandbox application.
As far as we know, most documented research
focused on virtual machines, live digital forensics
and cloud live digital forensics. In [11], the authors
investigated Sandboxie application artifices from a
forensics perspective. However, the paper claims no
trails could be found for any activity if a user deletes
his Sandboxie content. Moreover, the memory analysis
process did not examine the Sandboxie application
before deleting the application’s content.

Our study will examine the standalone sandbox
applications indicators of compromise on Windows
systems. Different tools will be used to acquire and
analyse the RAM images. An investigation methodology
will be recommended and the comparison between
the results will be conducted. This study will widen
the research scope of [11] paper by examining three
standalone sandbox applications before and after
deleting the application’s data on three Windows
operating systems.

3. Sandbox Applications on Live Digital Forensics
Investigation on Windows
In this section, we will analyse the impact of
standalone sandbox applications on Windows live
forensics images.

3.1. Operating Systems and Standalone Sandbox
Applications
The experiments testbeds run Windows operating system
as the testbeds operating system, these experiments are
conducted in 2018.
Windows operating system held 82.55 percentage of
the desktop operating system global market share in
2018 [12]. According to [13], the most desktop shared
Windows operating systems in 2018 is Windows 7,
which shares 43.57 per cent of the desktop market,
Windows XP is the oldest operating system that still
shares 4.36 per cent of the market. Windows 10 is
released in 2015, it runs a built-in sandbox known
as Windows sandbox, which permanently deletes the
whole Sandbox’s content after closing it. The Windows
Sandbox is a type of virtual machine sandbox. Thus it is
out of scope in this research.
The experiments testbeds will run the following
operating systems:
– Windows 7 Enterprise Service Pack 1, 16 GB
RAM, Intel®Xeon®, CPU 3.50 GHz, hard disk
HDD 500 GB, 64-bit, HP Z440;
– Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard, 16 GB RAM,
Intel®Xeon®, CPU 3.50 GHz, 64-bit, hard disk
HDD 500 GB, HP Z440;
– Windows XP Professional version 2002 Service
Pack, 2 GB RAM, Intel®Celeron®, CPU 1.86 GHz,
32-bit, hard disk HDD 500 GB, ecoquiet RM.
The standalone sandbox applications have four
categories:
– Category 1: Applications that allow the user to
run applications within the sandbox environment,
e.g., Sandboxie and Shade [8, 14];
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– Category 2: Applications that allow creating a
snapshot of the operating system and save the
system current state, e.g., ToolWiz Time Freeze
and Shadow Defender [8, 14];
– Category 3: Applications that create virtual space
to run the applications inside it, e.g., BufferZone
[8, 14];

Therefore, DumpIt and WinPmem version 2.1 will
be used to acquire the memory images, and Volatility
version 2.4 and Rekall version 1.7.2 and Hex workstation
version 1.7.7.0 will be used to analyse the acquired
images.

3.3. Experimental Setup

In our experiments, the most popular standalone
sandbox applications of each category will be chosen:
Sandboxie, ToolWiz Time Freeze and BufferZone. Each
tool represents one category of standalone sandbox
applications categories. The last category will not be
considered because this category only allows browsing
the websites, which is not compatible with the
experiments setups in Section 3.3.
Below are the details about the operating systems and
sandbox applications:

The experiment have two scenarios: the first scenario is
acquiring memory image of clean Windows operating
system after generating user data within the Sandbox
applications. The second scenario is acquiring the
image of the memory after deleting the data of the
Sandbox applications.
The experiment setup contains ten steps as shown
in Figure 1, the steps divided into three categories
installation process, generating user data and acquisition
process
The second category in the experiment step contains
five steps to generate user data within the standalone
sandbox applications on the selected experiments
machines in Section 3.1:

– Category 1: Sandboxie version 5.24.0.0 for Windows 7 and Windows server 12; version 5.22.0.0
for Windows XP;

– Step 1: Browse “http://bing.com” website and
search for “Cryptolocker source” using Internet
Explorer within the sandbox application.

– Category 2: ToolWiz Time Freeze version 4.3.1.500
for Windows 7 and Windows server 12; version
3.2.0.200 for Windows XP;

– Step 2: Open Command Prompt within the
sandbox application and running the following
commands: cd “picture directory”, dir,ipconfig
and netstat.

– Category 4: Applications that only run web
browsing, e.g., BitBox [8].

– Category 3: BufferZone version 4.02-127 for
Windows 7, Windows Server 12 and Windows XP.

– Step 3: Create a text file named “link” using
Notepad.exe inside the sandbox application,
that contains “Cryptolocker: github.com the Zoo
sentence”.

3.2. Tools
The experiments will use memory image acquisition
tools and memory image analysis tools to acquire
and analyse the operating system images. Windows
operating system has different tools that run only to
acquire memory images. The tools are chosen based
on the essential and the desirable criteria, as shown in
Table 1 and Table 2.
This study have two essential criteria and one
desirable criteria to chose acquisition tools. The
essential criteria are supporting all Windows operating
systems because of the study scope and running
without installation to eliminate the system changes
due to the installation process. On the other hand, the
desirable criteria are free software because investigators
may pay for the Proprietary software. Table 1 shows
that only two tools met the criteria: DumpIt latest version
and WinPmem-2.1.post4.
The analysis tools essential critical are supporting all
Windows operating system and open-source software.
The desirable criteria are free software. The two tools
that achieved the criteria are Volatility and Rekall.

– Step 4: Install Thunderbird version 52.7.0 inside
the sandbox application and send an email
with “cryptolocker” as the title using the same
application.
– Step 5: Install Tor version 7.5.3 inside the
sandbox application then visit the following
link “https://www.github.com/ytisf/theZoo/ using
tor browser.

4. Results
The experiments used DumpIt and WinPmem
to acquire the memory images from experiments
machines. Volatility, Rekall and Hex Workshop were
used to analyse the acquired memory images. Regshot
version 1.8.3 and TCPView version 3.05 were used to
detect the change in the experiments machines after
generating user data within the sandbox applications
as part of the experiment setup.
Table 3 reflects the changes on the experiment
machine’s hard disk and memory after generating user
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Table 1. Essential and the desirable criteria of acquisition tools
Tools
Belkasoft
WindowsSCOPE
Winen.exe
Memoryze
Kntdd
DumpIt
FTK Imager
OSForensics
WinPmem

Essential criteria
Support all Windows OS Run without installation
√
×
√
√

Desirable criteria
Free
√
×

√
×
√
√

X
√

√

√

×
√
×
√

√

√
×

√

√
×
√

√

√

Table 2. Essential and the desirable criteria of memory images analysis tools
Tools
Belkasoft
Volatility
Responder
Memoryze
Rekall

Essential criteria
Support all Windows OS
Open source
×
√

Desirable criteria
Free
√

×
√

√

×

×
√

×
√

√

√
√
√

data within Sandboxie application. Table 4 reflects the
changes on the experiment machine’s hard disk and
memory after generating user data within BufferZone
application. Table 5 reflects the changes on the
experiment machine’s hard disk and memory after
generating user data within ToolWiz application.
There was one problem during the setups. BufferZone
application was not able to start on Windows server
12 due to compatibility problem. The latest version,
which compatible with Windows 10, was downloaded.
However, the version was not compatible with Windows
server 12.
Table 6 shows the acquisition processes status; Table
7 and Table 8 shows the analysis processes status. There
was one problem faced during the acquisition process,
the tool WinPmem was not able to run on Windows
XP. The problem was with the compiler used by the
WinPmem tool that known as MSVC compiler. The
MSVC compilers do not support the old version of the
Windows operating system. Thus, only the DumpIt tool
was used to acquire the memory image of the Windows
XP machine’s memory.
The results of analysing the memory images are
shown in Table 9, Table 10 and Table 11. We used
two commands of WinPmem to capture the memory

images. The first command is WinPmem.exe –format
raw -o the-image-name.raw, the images captured using
this command cannot be analysed using Volatility tool.
The second command is WinPmem.exe -o the-imagename.aff4, which create aff4 compressed images. The
compressed images need to be decompressed using
the following command WinPmem.exe the-compressedimages.aff4 -e PhysicalMemeory -o the-image.raw. The
command extracted the physical memory from the compressed images. The analysis process was conducted
on the images that were acquired from the Windows
operating systems machines. We use Volatility, Rekall
and Hex Workshop to analyse the memory images. The
Volatility tool and Rekall tool extract similar results,
but some different plugins were used in Volatility that
Rekall does not have it, such as desktop snapshots.
There was no difference in the results retrieved from
image tests on the different operating systems.
Using Volatility tool and Rekall tool to analyse the
memory images of the machine before the content of
the applications where deleted, retrieve the information
about the running processes, the processes tree, the
sessions, the command line, the dll files, the processes
handlers, the network information and the opened
files. Open the same memory images using the Hex
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Figure 1. Experiments setup for analysing sandbox applications on Windows OS
Workshop tool shows all the applications data that were
used during the experimental setups. The results show
the websites that were visited, the email sent using
Thunderbird application, the text file that was created
and ipconfig and netstat the two commands used in
Command Prompt.
The results showed that there were two more
processes in the Sandboxie images and BufferZone
image. The two processes are SbieSvc.exe for Sandboxie
application and BZPackCmd64.exe process BufferZone
application. Every register was created using these
two programs were saved under the program register
hive. However, in the ToolWiz Time Freeze program,
the applications opened under the program running
separately from the program, where the applications
create their own process and registry keys.
Analyse the memory images after deleting the
application’s content of the generated user data in

Section 3.3 using Volatility tool and Rekall only showed
the Command Prompt commands of the Sandboxie
images. While opening the images using Hex Workshop
showed information about the deleted content. The tool
showed all the deleted content of the Sandboxie and
BufferZone. However, the ToolWiz time zone images
only revealed the name of the installed applications and
the picture that was saved from the internet.

5. Discussion
The operating systems in Section 3.1 were reinstalled
before each experiment to ensure the systems’ integrity.
By reinstalling the operating systems, the system’s
same status was guaranteed before installing any
standalone sandbox applications. The image integrity
cannot be guaranteed because the memory might
change, although no new applications were opened
during the acquisition process.
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Table 3. System changes from generating user data in experiment setup within Sandboxie
Changes on the hard disk

Changes on the memory

Step 1

– Several registry keys and values added under
"HKLM\Sandbox_test_Default"
– Several cache files added under "C:\Sandboxie" directory
– Change in the Software log, System log and Security log

– "Start.exe" and "iexplorer.exe"
processes started

Step 2

– Several registry keys and values added under
"HKLM\Sandbox_test_Default"
– Change in the Software log

–
"Start.exe",
"cmd.exe",
"netstat.exe" and "ipconfig.exe"
processes started

Step 3

– Several registry keys and values added
– Several cash files added under "C:\Sandboxie" directory
– “link.txt” saved under the Sandboxie directory
– Change in the Software log

– "Start.exe" and "Notepad.exe"
process started

Step 4

– Several registry keys and values added
– Several cache files added under "C:\Sandboxie" directory
– Change in the Software log and System log

– "Start.exe" and "Thunderbird.exe" process started

Step 5

– Several registry keys and values added under
"HKLM\Sandbox_test_Default"
– Several cache files added under "C:\Sandboxie" directory
– Change in the Software log, System log and Security log

– "Start.exe" and "Tor.exe" process started

Table 4. System changes from generating user data in the experiment setup within BufferZone
Changes on the hard disk

Changes on the memory

Step 1

– Several registry keys and values added under
"HKLM\Software \BufferZone\Virtual"
– Several cache files added under "C:\Virtual" directory
– Change in the Software log and System log

– "iexplorer.exe" process started

Step 2

– Several registry keys and values added under
"HKLM\Software \BufferZone\Virtual"
– Change in the Software log

– "cmd.exe", "netstat.exe" and
"ipconfig.exe" processes started

Step 3

– Several registry keys and values added
– Several cash files added under "C:\Virtual" directory
– “link.txt” saved under the Virtual directory
– Change in the Software log

– "Notepad.exe" process started

Step 4

– Several registry keys and values added under
"HKLM\Software \BufferZone\Virtual"
– Several cache files added under "C:\Virtual" directory
– Change in the Software log and System log

– "Thunderbird.exe"
started

Step 5

– Several registry keys and values added under
"HKLM\Software \BufferZone\Virtual"
– Several cache files added under "C:\Virtual" directory
– Change in the Software log and System log

– "Tor.exe" process started

The results showed no difference in the results
between the Volatility tool and the Rekall tool.
However, Rekall was able to analyse the images
acquired using DumpIt and WinPmem tools, unlike
Volatility that could not analyse all the images that were

process

acquired using WinPmem. Hex Workshop was able to
show all the memory content but without specifications.
This problem happens because the Volatility profile
used to identify memory content failed to identify
the memory architecture of the images taken using
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Table 5. System changes from generating user data in the experiment setup within ToolWiz Time Freeze
Changes on the hard disk

Changes on the memory

Step 1

– Several registry keys and values added
– Several cache files added
– Change in the Software log and System log

–
"iexplorer.exe"
started

Step 2

– Several registry keys and values added
– Change in the Software log

– "cmd.exe", "netstat.exe" and
"ipconfig.exe" processes started

Step 3

– Several registry keys and values added
– Several cash files added
– “link.txt” saved under “Document” directory
– Change in the Software log

– "Notepad.exe" process started

Step 4

– Several registry keys and values added
– Several cache files added
– Change in the Software log and System log

– "Thunderbird.exe"
started

Step 5

– Several registry keys and values added
– Several cache files added
– Change in the Software log, System log and Security log

– "Tor.exe" process started

processes

process

Table 6. Acquisition process status
Tools

Sandbox applications

DumpIt

Sandboxie
BufferZone
ToolWiz

WinPmem

Sandboxie
BufferZone
ToolWiz

Windows 7
√
√
√

Windows server 2012
√

√
√
√

√

×
√

Windows XP
√
√
√
×
×
×

×
√

Table 7. Volatility analysis process status
Windows OS

Tools

Windows 7

DumpIt
WinPmem

Windows server 2012

DumpIt
WinPmem

Windows XP

DumpIt
WinPmem

WinPmem –format command. WinPmem creates images
that cannot be identified by Volatility. Thus, the best
tools to acquire and analyse the images are DumpIt and
Rekall. However, the tools can still be used in specific
circumstances. WinPmem can be used if Rekall was
used as an analysis tool and Volatility can be used if the
images were acquired using DumpIt.
The results also showed that the standalone sandbox
application’s data can be easy to retrieved from
the images of Windows 7, Windows Server 12 and

Sandboxie
√
×
√

Volatility
BufferZone
√
×

ToolWiz
√
×
√

×
√

×
×
√

×
√

×

×

×

Windows XP memories. However, even after deleting
the content of the sandbox applications, the full content
of the Sandboxie and BufferZone were retrieved, except
the content of the ToolWiz Time Freeze tool that only
retrieve the names of the installed applications while
the sandbox application was running. This happens
because the ToolWiz Time Freeze required restarting
the system to delete the content of the application.
The Sandboxie and BufferZone do not require restarting
after deleting the content. Nevertheless, the BufferZone
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Table 8. Rekall analysis process status
Windows OS

Tools

Windows 7

DumpIt
WinPmem

Windows Server 2012

DumpIt
WinPmem

Windows XP

DumpIt
WinPmem

Rekall
BufferZone
√
√

Sandboxie
√
√
√
√
√

×
×
√

×

×

ToolWiz
√
√
√
√
√
×

Table 9. Analysis results of the Sandboxie images
Tools

Before deleting Sandboxie’s content

After deleting Sandboxie’s content

Volatility

– Six processes that were run within Sandboxie,
SbieSvc.exe, start processes, netstat and ipconfig
processes
– Command Prompt commands
– Created text file
– Created file’s dump
– Sessions
– Processes handlers
– Registry
– Registry hive’s dump
– Desktop snapshots

– Command Prompt commands

Rekall

– Six processes that were run within Sandboxie,
SbieSvc.exe, start processes, netstat and ipconfig
processes
– Command Prompt commands
– Created text file
– Created file’s dump
– Sessions
– Processes handlers
– Registry
– Registry hive’s dump

– Command Prompt commands

Hex Workshop

– Visited website
– Created text file
– Thunderbird details
– Thunderbird’s email
– Tor’s data

– Visited website
– Created text file
– Thunderbird details
– Thunderbird’s email
– Tor’s data

content can still be retrieved from the memory after
deleting the content and restarting the system.
The applications running under the Sandboxie
application can be easily spotted from the process
list because the applications process runs under the
SbieSvc.exe process. The other two standalone sandbox
applications do not force the applications to start
under a specific process. The Sandboxie and BufferZone
applications store the application data to the hard disk
in a specific directory. Sandboxie application saves the
data in C:\Sandboxie directory, while BufferZone saves

the data in C:\Virtual directory. If the user restarts
the system without deleting Sandboxie and BufferZone
data, the data can still be found after restarting, which
mean the application’s artefacts can be found during
offline digital forensics. The ToolWiz Time Freeze
application data will be gone after a restart, even if
the user did not choose to delete the application’s
content. This means to analyse the artefacts of the
application the system has to be running, unlike
the other two applications where only the running
applications processes will be lost.
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Table 10. Analysis results of the BufferZone images
Tools

Before deleting BufferZone’s content

After deleting BufferZone’s content

Volatility

– Six processes that were run within BufferZone,
BZPackCmd64.exe process, netstat and ipconfig
– Command Prompt commands
– The created text file
– Created file’s dump
– Sessions
– Processes handlers
– Registry
– Registry hive’s dump
– Desktop snapshots

– Command Prompt commands

Rekall

– Six processes that were run within BufferZone,
BZPackCmd64.exe process, netstat and ipconfig
– Command Prompt commands
– The created text file
– Created file’s dump
– Sessions
– Processes handlers
– Registry
– Registry hive’s dump

– Command Prompt commands

Hex Workshop

– Visited website
– Created text file
– Thunderbird details
– Thunderbird email
– Tor data

– Visited website
– Created text file
– Thunderbird details
– Thunderbird email
– Tor data

To summarise, Rekall can analyse the image acquired
using DumpIt and WinPmem, unlike Volatility that
cannot identify the memory architecture of images
acquired using WinPmem. Hex Workshop can analyse
all the memory images, but the analyst has to identify
the type and specification of the data. All the Sanboxies
and BufferZone data can be retrieved even after deleting
the user data of the applications. However, only the
installed application’s names can be retrieved from the
ToolWiz Time Freeze image after deleting the user data.
ToolWiz Time Freeze required the system to restart
after deleting the user data, which lose the memory
data.

5.1. Limitations and Constraints
The limitations were in the compatibility of the
programs, for example, the compatibility of BufferZone
with Windows server 2012. This problem limits the
analysis of the BufferZone application artefacts.
The results in Section 4 showed that WinPmem could
not run on the Windows XP operating system due to
compiler compatibility. Yet DumpIt was able to run
and conduct the memory images without any problems.

WinPmem needs the compiler because it is a kernellevel tool that has to inject the kernel driver to acquire
the physical memory image.
Another limitation was analysing the images created
using WinPmem with Volatility tools. The Volatility
profile failed to identify the memory architecture of the
WinPmem images.

6. Conclusion
In this study, we evaluated the impact of sandbox
applications on live digital forensics investigation on
Windows systems. Three Windows standalone sandbox
applications were tested on the Windows systems.
We found that Volatility cannot analyse the images
acquired by WinPmem and WinPmem cannot run
on Windows XP. Rekall and Volatility have the same
capabilities with minor differences. Other results show
that only the installed applications can be found after
deleting the ToolWiz Time Freeze content. Unlike
Sandboxie and BufferZone, their data can be retrieved
from the memory images even after deleting the
application’s content. However, Sandboxie application
memory image after restarting the system will not
retrieve any artefacts.
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Table 11. Analysis results of the ToolWiz Time Freeze images
Tools

Before deleting ToolWiz’s content

After deleting ToolWiz’s content

Volatility

– Six processes that were run within ToolWiz time
free, ToolWiz Time Fre process, netstat and ipconfig
– Command Prompt commands
– The created text file
– Dump the created file
– Sessions
– Processes handlers
– Registry
– Dump the registry hive
– Desktop snapshots

– No trace found

Rekall

– Six processes that were run within ToolWiz time
free, ToolWiz Time Fre process, netstat and ipconfig
– Command Prompt commands
– The created text file
– Created file’s dump
– Sessions
– Processes handlers
– Registry
– Registry hive’s dump

– No trace found

Hex Workshop

– Visited website
– Created text file
– Thunderbird details
– Thunderbird emails
– Tor data

– Name of installed applications

We also found that not all of the data of the
sandbox applications will be deleted after restarting
the systems. However, after deleting the sandbox
application’s content and restart the system, all the
data on the memory will be volatile. Some applications
like BufferZone do not delete the application’s content
on the memory even after restarting it. Sandboxie and
BufferZone save their data to the system hard disk,
which indicates the applications data can be retrieved
using offline digital forensics.

6.1. Recommendations

should be used to analyse the acquired memory image
of the system under investigation. After analysing the
images using Rekall tool, Hex Workshop can be used to
get more information.
Even the standalone sandbox application’s data was
deleted, using the above methodology might retrieve
some of the standalone sandbox application data unless
the system under investigation was restarted, which
decrease the possibility of retrieving the standalone
sandbox application data.
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